[NYtenants-online] Tenant Pioneer Jane Wood passes away
Tenant
tenant@tenant.net
Mon, 22 Mar 2004 09:11:44 -0500
NYtenants Online/TenantNet 3/22/04
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IN THIS ISSUE ...
1. Jane Wood passes away, a pioneer in tenant advocacy
2. Landlord Lawyer Burden slapped by Disciplinary Committee
3. Larry Wolf on the Gong Show
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JANE WOOD, 96, TENANT ACTIVIST, IS DEAD
By DAVID W. CHEN
NY Times
March 19, 2004
Jane Wood, a longtime tenant advocate and political radical in New York who
once pressured her landlord to replace a broken elevator by sleeping on an
air mattress in the lobby, died on Wednesday at her apartment in Manhattan.
She was 96.
Ms. Wood died from respiratory complications stemming from a fall last
month in which she fractured a rib, said her stepson, Timothy Wood.
Considered a giant in the tenants' rights movement, Ms. Wood was credited
by housing advocates for helping to prevent the eviction of hundreds, if
not thousands, of tenants, as her Chelsea neighborhood became gentrified.
She was the founder of the Chelsea Coalition on Housing, an advocacy group
for low-income tenants, and could always deliver a rousing speech at tenant
protests, Rent Guidelines Board meetings or neighborhood rallies.
Ms. Wood was one of the last of a breed of activists whose socialist
sensibilities were shaped by the Depression, though not through personal
deprivation. Ms. Wood was born into a family of means, a world she
eventually rejected to help the downtrodden.
Born Janet Kauffman in 1907, Ms. Wood grew up in St. Louis as the only
child of Harold M. Kauffman, a wealthy banker, and Jeanette Morton, a
socialite and Mayflower descendant. She was related to the Davis family,
the namesake of the Davis Cup of tennis. And while Ms. Wood attended Smith
College, her sorority mentor was Anne Morrow, the writer who later married
Charles A. Lindbergh, her stepson said.
After moving to New York City in the 1930's, Ms. Wood became active in
socialist causes and tried to help the poor. "She felt that what she saw
was terrible, and she felt that she had to do something for those less
fortunate," Mr. Wood said.
In the 1940's, she married Robert Wood, a fellow activist, who later opened
a business importing cigars. He died in 1963. Ms. Wood is survived by her
stepson and a stepdaughter, Sara Gearry, of Coeburn, Va.
Because of her husband's cigar business, Ms. Wood traveled to Cuba. She
made numerous trips there after the embargo was imposed, ferrying medical
supplies and other goods. She met Fidel Castro as well, and to the end
praised his communist regime, said Kernan Huttick, treasurer and tenant
organizer with the Chelsea Coalition on Housing.
Ms. Wood founded the Chelsea group in the 1950's after protesting plans to
build the Penn Station South housing development, a middle-income
cooperative. The complex ultimately went up, but Ms. Wood helped ensure
that the low-income workers who lost their homes were given priority in the
new housing.
In the 1990's, one of Ms. Wood's notable fights involved the eviction of
several women living at Leo House, a women's residence affiliated with
Catholic Charities. Though Leo House ultimately won the fight, the
evictions were stalled for several years.
In 2001, Ms. Wood staged what may have been her most colorful protest:
sleeping in the lobby of her apartment building to pressure the landlord to
hasten the replacement of the elevator, which at that point had been out of
service for months. She installed an air mattress in the lobby and went to
bed there in a nightgown and nightcap.
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LANDLORD ATTORNEY SLAPPED BY DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
Joseph Burden, a partner with Belkin Burden Wenig & Goldman, LLP, is one of
NYC's most notorious landlord lawyers, was recently suspended from practice
in New York State for three months for "conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." Unfortunately we see this sort of
behavior from landlord lawyers all too often, and it's very rare that any
action is taken.
The decision by the NY State Appellate Division, follows:
Decided on February 17, 2004
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
First Judicial Department
Peter Tom,Justice Presiding,
David B. Saxe
Joseph P. Sullivan
Alfred D. Lerner
David Friedman,Justices.
M-4577
In the Matter of Joseph Burden, an attorney and counselor-at-law:
Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department,
Petitioner, Joseph Burden, Esq., Respondent.
Discplinary proceedings instituted by the Departmental Disciplinary
Committee for the First Judicial Department. Respondent was admitted to the
Bar of the State of New York at a Term of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court for the Fourth Judicial Department on March 7, 1975. James T.
Shed, of counsel (Thomas J. Cahill, Chief Counsel) for petitioner. Michael
S. Ross for respondent. M-4577 - October 31, 2003 IN THE MATTER OF JOSEPH
BURDEN, AN ATTORNEY
PER CURIAM
Respondent Joseph Burden was admitted to the practice of law in the State
of New York by the Fourth Judicial Department on March 7, 1975, and, at all
times relevant to this proceeding, has maintained an office for the
practice of law within this Department.
On August 13, 2002, the Departmental Disciplinary Committee (Committee)
served respondent with a notice and statement of charges containing 11
counts alleging that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) [conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation]; DR 1-102(A)(5) [engaging
in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice]; and DR
1-102(A)(7) [conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness as a
lawyer] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
These charges arose out of respondent's abuse of trial subpoenas he issued
in a special proceeding pending in Housing Court. In particular,
respondent, as landlord's counsel, issued various trial subpoenas to third
parties seeking the financial and medical records of a tenant without
complying with CPLR 408. CPLR 408 requires, in pertinent part, leave of
court for such discovery in a special proceeding and further requires that
these subpoenaed documents be delivered directly to the court and made
available only after a court's express approval.
Previously, the Housing Court denied respondent's request for certain
information it had deemed private and unavailable. Using letter requests,
respondent improperly urged that the subpoenaed documents be sent directly
to him rather than the court, subverting the court's procedure for
receiving, maintaining and releasing subpoenaed records. Upon learning of
respondent's abuse of the trial subpoenas, counsel for the tenant moved to
quash and for sanctions. Respondent submitted an affirmation in response
falsely claiming that the subpoenaed documents were sent to his office
without solicitation or suggestion by him. In its decision, the Housing
Court found that respondent's use of the subpoenas was an abuse of process
and that respondent had made a false statement to the court. Accordingly,
the subpoenas were quashed, respondent sanctioned in the amount of $1,000
and the matter referred to the Committee.
In response to the Committee's letter regarding the matter, respondent
again falsely stated that the subject subpoenas were voluntarily sent to
his office without his urging. In his answer to the Committee's formal
charges and in a pre-hearing stipulation, however, respondent later
acknowledged violating Disciplinary Rules in connection with each of the 11
counts of the charges. At the hearing held before a Referee, the Committee
recommended a one-year suspension and respondent urged a public censure.
The Referee subsequently sustained all 11 counts and recommended a
three-month suspension with automatic reinstatement after the suspension. A
Hearing Panel unanimously agreed with the Referee's report and the
recommended sanction.
The Committee now petitions this Court for an order pursuant to 22 NYCRR
603.4(d) and 605.15 (e)(2), confirming the determination of the Hearing
Panel, and suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of
three months.
Inasmuch as respondent had admitted and stipulated to violating
Disciplinary Rules in connection with each of the 11 counts of the
Committee's charges, which were independently supported by the evidence
adduced at the hearing, the petition should be granted. We find that
respondent's misconduct was a deliberate circumvention of the Housing
Court's rules and procedures by soliciting and obtaining documents by the
abuse of judicial subpoenas. Further, we find that respondent's false
statements to the Housing Court and to the Committee were calculated to
conceal respondent's unethical behavior. Under these circumstances,
respondent's suspension for a period of three months is warranted.
Accordingly, the Committee's petition should be granted and the
determination of the Hearing Panel should be confirmed to the extent of
suspending respondent from the practice of law in the State of New York for
a period of three months and to be reinstated pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.14
(a)(1).
All concur.
Order filed.
(February 17, 2004)
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LARRY WOLF'S INTIMIDATION TACTICS CATCH UP WITH HIM
decision from NY Law Journal, 03/09/2004
by Housing Court
The following is the text of a decision from NYC Housing Court, where
landlord attorney Lawrence Wolf was challenged for his use of illegal
Backdoor Subpoenas. Jamie Fishman, of the firm Fishman & Neil, represented
the tenant. Considered by some as one of the most pathetic examples of the
legal profession, Wolf is seen as the in-house counsel for notorious
landlord Lloyd Goldman, but more likely considered as "Giggle Test Larry."
Getting a front-row seat to watch his antics is, in itself, probably a
justification for rent withholding.
Civil Court
Housing Part A
Judge Schreiber
Petitioner commenced this holdover proceeding against the executor of the
estate of Robert Mooney claiming the estate illegally sublet or assigned
the rent stabilized subject premises to under-respondent Frank Garcia. Mr.
Garcia is the only respondent who has appeared in the case. On October 9,
2002 he served a written answer in which he asserts succession rights to
the subject premises as a non-traditional family member under Rent
Stabilization Code ("RSC") §§2523.5(b) and 2520.6(o)(2) because he lived
with the deceased prime tenant, Robert Mooney, as his domestic partner for
more than two years prior to Mr. Mooney's death. The answer included a
demand for a jury trial. The case was marked off calendar on March 24, 2003
pending document production and a deposition of Mr. Garcia. The discovery
was concluded and on November 3, 2003, pursuant to a stipulation, the case
was restored to the calendar; the answer was amended only to the extent of
including an affirmative defense and counterclaim for breach of warranty of
habitability. The petitioner moved to strike the jury demand and for
outstanding use and occupancy; the motion was denied on December 8, 2003 as
petitioner failed to appear after checking in to the Part.
On January 9, 2004 respondent moved for an order requiring petitioner to
identify and produce all of the subpoenas it issued, quashing three
subpoenas known to have been issued, quashing any additional subpoenas
issued by petitioner which may be improper, directing petitioner's counsel
to produce the original of any document received in response to the
improper subpoenas, staying issuance of any further improper subpoenas,
suppressing all information obtained directly in response to any improper
subpoena, and awarding costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 22 NYCRR Part
130-1.1(a) based on frivolous conduct. Petitioner cross-moved to strike the
jury demand and for outstanding use and occupancy.
Respondent states that he discovered that petitioner's counsel, Lawrence
Wolf ("Mr. Wolf"), issued three non-party subpoena duces tecum which state,
"[m]ake telephone inquiries to Virna Maldonado if you wish to provide
required information and not have to appear in Court (212) 557-6700."
According to respondent, Ms. Maldonado is Mr. Wolf's secretary; the
telephone number referred to in the subpoenas is Mr. Wolf's office. The
subpoenas were issued to Verizon-New York, Consolidated Edison and the
Department of the Aging. The subpoena to the Department of the Aging was
"so ordered" by this Court with a directive that, "a copy of this subpoena
is to be served on respondent's counsel within 48 hours of service on the
Dept. of Aging."
Respondent's counsel states he was never served with a copy of the
Department of the Aging subpoena as ordered by this Court. He states that
he first discovered the subpoenas on January 7, 2004 when Mr. Garcia
received a letter addressed to Mr. Mooney from Verizon regarding the
subpoena issued to it. Subsequently, he learned from the court clerk on
January 8, 2004 of the two other subpoenas for Consolidated Edison and the
Department of the Aging. Respondent's counsel argues that issuance of these
subpoenas, which direct the delivery of evidentiary materials to
petitioner's attorney's office, and not to the Court as required pursuant
to CPLR §2301, constitutes "back door discovery" which has been condemned
by both lower and appellate courts. See, e.g., Henriques v. Boitano,
10/27/99 NYLJ 27: 3 (Civ. Ct. NY Cty), aff'd 8/29/00 NYLJ 22: 2 (AT 1st
Dep't) mod as to fees 2003 NY Slip Op 13347 (AD 1st Dep't).
A subpoena duces tecum may be issued by an attorney "to compel the
production of specific documents that are relevant and material to facts at
issue in a pending judicial proceeding." Matter of Terry D., 81 N.Y.2d
1042, 1044 (1993). However, "[a] trial subpoena may not be used as a
'fishing expedition' to obtain materials that could have been obtained in
pretrial disclosure," Mestel & Co. v. Smythe Masterson & Judd, 215 A.D.2d
329 (1st Dep't 1995), nor should it be used as a substitute for discovery
or "to ascertain the existence of evidence." Matter of Terry D., 81 N.Y.2d
at 1044. Disclosure in summary proceedings is further limited pursuant to
CPLR §408 by the need to obtain leave of Court.
Service requirements for subpoenas duces tecum are found in Articles 23
(Subpoenas, Oaths and Affirmations) and 31 (Disclosure) of the CPLR. In a
summary proceeding, after obtaining leave of Court, CPLR §3120(3) states
that a party issuing a subpoena duces tecum to another party or any other
person[1] shall at the same time serve a copy of the subpoena upon all
other parties and, within five days of compliance, give to each party
notice that the items produced are available for inspection and copying,
specifying the time and place. CPLR §2301 allows an attorney of record for
a party to issue a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of
documents in Court for trial. Effective January 1, 2004, CPLR §2303(a),
like CPLR 3120(3), requires service of a subpoena duces tecum "on each
party who has appeared in the action so that it is received by such parties
promptly after service on the witness and before he production of books,
papers or other things."
In Henriques v. Boitano, 10/27/99 NYLJ 27: 3 (Civ. Ct. NY Cty), aff'd
8/29/00 NYLJ 22: 2 (AT 1st Dep't) mod as to fees 2003 NY Slip Op 13347 (AD
1st Dep't), petitioner's counsel issued, without notice to respondents,
subpoenas duces tecum indicating that the information could be sent
directly to the office of counsel for the petitioner in order to obviate
the need for an appearance in court. The Appellate Term held that the
subpoenas were improper due, inter alia, to the inclusion of "cover letters
which, as the motion court accurately described, were 'calculated to yield
a turnover of documents directly to Petitioner's counsel'." The Court
further found that suppression of the information obtained was appropriate
since the course followed by the attorney was at "variance with acceptable
discovery practice." (Quoting Matter of Beiny, 129 A.D.2d 126, 133 (1st
Dep't 1987), lv dism 71 N.Y.2d 994.) In addition, it upheld the propriety
of sanctions for the conduct which it agreed was frivolous.
Here, petitioner issued three subpoenas on non-parties and failed to serve
a copy of the subpoenas on the respondent's counsel. Not only were the
subpoenas not served on all parties, but in addition they contained
improper language suggesting that the witnesses could bypass a court
appearance and merely supply information to petitioner's counsel. Finally,
the subpoena on the Department of the Aging was signed by this Court with a
directive that petitioner serve the subpoena on respondent's counsel within
forty-eight hours of service on the Department of the Aging.[2] Petitioner
failed to comply with that order.
In opposition to the motion Mr. Wolf states that he is aware that discovery
in summary proceedings must be on notice to his adversary but asserts that
this is not true for issuance of trial subpoenas. It appears Mr. Wolf may
not have been aware of the revised provisions of the CPLR noted above. Even
before the revisions however, a motion was required, on notice to all
parties, prior to service of a subpoena on a nonparty. Assuming Mr. Wolf
was unaware of CPLR §§3120(3) or 2303(a), he has not presented any excuse
for his failure to serve respondent's counsel with a copy of the subpoena
on the Department of the Aging, despite this Court's direction.
Mr. Wolf claims that after his adversary contacted him regarding the
language in the subpoenas suggesting a manner in which to avoid a court
appearance, he wrote to the subpoenaed parties and informed them that they
should ignore that portion of the subpoenas. The opposition papers do not
include either a statement from Mr. Wolf or an affidavit from his
secretary, Ms. Maldonado, stating whether any documents or information was
received from those subpoenaed.
Based on the foregoing, the respondent's request to quash the subpoenas on
Consolidated Edison, Verizon New York and the Department of the Aging is
granted. However, as to the remaining relief sought by respondent the
motion is granted to the extent of ordering a hearing on February 11, 2004,
Pt. A at 3 p.m. Mr. Wolf and his secretary should be prepared to testify
regarding issuance of any other subpoenas, documents received in response
to the subpoenas, and whether any materials received were copied; they
should bring to Court copies of each subpoena, any material received, and
all copies of those materials. Whether any information obtained should be
suppressed will be determined after the hearing. Finally, respondent's
request for an award of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 22 NYCRR Part
130-1.1(a) is granted as the conduct of Mr. Wolf was without basis in law
and therefore frivolous. The hearing will also address the appropriate
amount of fees and costs.
Petitioner's notice of cross motion seeks payment of use and occupancy.
However, the affirmation in support is silent with respect to what is owed
and petitioner fails to include an affidavit from someone with personal
knowledge regarding the alleged outstanding use and occupancy. As the issue
is raised only in the notice of motion and lacks any support, the motion is
denied.
The cross-motion also seeks to strike the jury demand. Petitioner claims
that Mr. Garcia cannot demand a trial by jury because Robert Mooney's 1971
lease contains a jury waiver clause and since Garcia asserts succession
rights he is bound by the lease terms. In opposition respondent argues that
petitioner waived its right to object to the jury demand since it failed to
move for such relief until thirteen months after the filing of the answer.
Specifically, he argues that the matter has appeared on the calendar on
numerous occasions and petitioner never once raised the issue. On November
3, 2003 petitioner even signed a stipulation agreeing to allow respondent
to amend his answer which again included the jury demand.
This Court need not address the issue of whether petitioner waived its
right to object to the jury demand, although it is noted that undue delay
may constitute waiver. See e.g., 55th Management Corp. v. Goldman, 2001 NY
Slip Op 40606U (AT 1st Dep't); Cantor v. 255 West 15th Holding Corp., 28
Misc.2d 503 (AT 1st Dep't 1960). The jury waiver clause in the original
lease cannot prevent a demand for a jury trial because at the time the
parties signed the lease in 1971 definitions of non-traditional family and
succession rights in RSC §§2520.6(o)(2) and 2523.5(b) had not yet been
enacted. Therefore, when the parties signed the lease they could not have
effectuated a knowing waiver of their right to a jury trial on this issue.
500 West End LLC v. Merkin, 4/26/00 NYLJ 28:4 (Civ. Ct. Ny Cty); Klipack v.
Raymar Novelties, 273 A.D. 54 (1st Dep't 1947). Accordingly, petitioner's
request to strike the jury demand is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court, copies of which are
being mailed by the Court to the attorneys below.
FootNotes:
[1] Prior to September 1, 2003, CPLR §3120(2)(b) required a motion on
notice to all adverse parties in order to obtain discovery and production
of documents as against a non-party; the non-party had to be served with
the request in the same manner as a summons. After September 1, 2003, the
requirement in paragraph 2(b) was replaced by subdivision (3).
[2] Although the subpoena was signed by the Court on December 16, 2003, the
court required this service as a result of CPLR §2303(a) (effective January
1, 2004) since the return date on the subpoena was January 28, 2004.