At depositions, the plaintiff mother testified that the basement apartment was mostly paneled and the painted areas were intact. The defendant testified that the premises were pained in 1985 before he moved in and he was not aware of the presence of any lead-based paint. Prior to receiving notice from the Department of Health, he was unaware of any chipping or peeling although he had the ceiling of the dining room repainted between 1995 and 1997. By order to abate nuisance dated August 22, 1997, the defendant was advised of the presence of lead-based paint in numerous areas of the first and second floor. The infant was removed from the upstairs areas and relocated to New Jersey until the abatement work was completed. In support of his motion to dismiss the action, the defendant claims that the Administrative Code (Local Rule 1) pertaining to lead based paint are inapplicable to this case because the building is not a multiple dwelling (three or more units whose residents live independent of each other), but rather according to environmental inspection reports, a one-two family dwelling. Due to the inapplicability of Local Law 1, the defendant argues that there can be no finding against him because he did not have notice of the condition until he received the Notice to Abate Nuisance.

The obligations of the owner of a multiple dwelling in New York City with regard to lead paint include removal or properly covering paint containing an excess of the designated amounts of lead in any unit which a child under 6 resides. The law creates a rebuttable presumption that in any unit within a multiple dwelling erected before 1960 in which a child under 6 resides, any peeling paint contains more than the acceptable designated levels of lead. Local Law 1 classifies the existence of paint containing more than the designated levels of lead in multiple dwelling units in which a child under 6 resides as a hazardous condition requiring correction.

The court stated that the language of Local Law 1 makes it clear that it applies only to multiple dwellings. It was not disputed that the premises in question consists of two dwelling units with one family occupying the two upper floors. The court found that the defendant proved that his sharing the premises did not make the building a multiple dwelling as a matter of law. The court held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the presumption that any peeling paint contains more than the acceptable designated levels of lead as created by Local Law 1 since this presumption only applies to multiple dwellings. The court ruled that the defendant could only be held liable for a defective lead-based paint condition if he had actual or constructive notice of the condition for a reasonable period of time that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have corrected it. In granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the defendant did not have notice of the hazard prior to the time the infant plaintiff was diagnosed and that he acted reasonably in correcting the condition after he did receive notice.

The wife's documentary evidence, including hospital records during the period of her marriage, placed her at 7 Jones Street. The super of 7 Jones Street and 23 Jones Street testified that she resided at 7 Jones Street. The lower court declined to charge the jury with a negative inference over the fact that the wife did not produce the husband's home care attendants who would have personal knowledge where the wife lived. In addition to the absence of any documentary evidence, the dissent regarded the failure to produce key witnesses, such as the home care attendant or a certain identified male tenant at 7 Jones Street who supposedly would have testified that she did not reside there, as evidence of the wife's inability to prove her case. The dissent noted that "while the absence of documentary evidence is not fatal to a primary residence case, there should be a preponderance of credible personal testimony." The dissent held that the only evidence supporting the wife's position that she resided with her husband was her testimony alone. He held that her testimony was contradicted by the documentary evidence and the super's testimony. The jury ruled 5 to 1 that she resided with her husband for the relevant period. The landlord moved to set aside the jury's verdict as against the weight of the evidence, but the lower court refused to do so. The Appellate Term upheld, but given Justice McCooe's vigorous dissent it is likely this case will go up to the Appellate Division.